Instructions Specific to This Exam

1. This examination contains four questions of unequal value, worth a total of 100 marks.

2. Suggested time allocations are provided for guidance only. Candidates remain responsible for managing the three-hour examination period.

3. Unless otherwise stated, assume that:

   • the parties reside in Ontario;

   • Ontario provincial family legislation applies where the matter falls within provincial jurisdiction; and

   • the current Divorce Act, Federal Child Support Guidelines, Family Law Act, and Children’s Law Reform Act apply where relevant.

4. You will be assessed primarily on your knowledge and application of the legislation, cases and principles contained in the assigned materials, including your ability to:

   • identify the legal issues raised by the facts;

   • select the appropriate statutory framework;

   • distinguish federal and provincial family-law rights where necessary;

   • apply the governing principles closely to the facts;

   • assess competing arguments; and

   • reach reasoned conclusions.

5. No marks are awarded for merely reproducing or summarizing the facts. Use the facts in your legal analysis.

6. Each question is independent. Do not import facts or conclusions from another question.

7. In parenting matters, the best interests of the child govern. Do not assume that:

   • equal parenting time is presumptively required;

   • a parent has a superior claim because of gender;

   • a child’s stated preference is automatically decisive; or

   • misconduct between spouses is relevant unless it bears upon parenting or the child’s interests.

8. Where family violence is raised, consider the statutory concept broadly. Do not limit the analysis to physical assault. Where relevant, consider patterns of coercive or controlling behaviour and their effect upon:

   • safety;

   • parenting;

   • communication;

   • decision-making; and

   • the ability of the parties to cooperate.

9. In relocation questions, distinguish:

   • the ordinary best-interests analysis;

   • the additional statutory relocation factors;

   • the applicable notice and objection requirements; and

   • any statutory burden of proof.

10. In child-support questions, distinguish among:

    • determination of income;

    • table support;

    • shared-parenting adjustments;

    • special or extraordinary expenses;

    • retroactive support; and

    • variation of an existing order.

11. Do not assume that voluntary reduction of income automatically reduces support. Conversely, do not assume that every career change amounts to intentional underemployment.

12. In Ontario property questions, keep distinct:

    • legal ownership;

    • calculation of net family property;

    • excluded property;

    • date-of-marriage deductions;

    • equalization;

    • unequal division;

    • and rights relating to possession or disposition of a matrimonial home.

13. An unequal division of net family properties is exceptional. Do not treat ordinary unfairness or an unattractive result as sufficient without applying the statutory standard.

14. Do not assume that unmarried cohabitants in Ontario have the same statutory property rights as married spouses. Analyze:

    • statutory support rights; and

    • equitable property claims
      separately.

15. Where unjust enrichment is raised, distinguish the existence of the cause of action from the appropriate remedy and the method by which any monetary award is quantified.

16. The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines may assist with amount and duration once entitlement to spousal support is established. They do not themselves create entitlement.

17. Interjurisdictional orders and child-protection proceedings are outside the scope of this examination.

18. Full case citations are unnecessary. Where authority is relevant, the case name and applicable statutory provision are sufficient.

19. Answer the question actually asked. Avoid generic essays or memorized checklists unrelated to the facts.

20. Write clear, organized answers in complete sentences.

QUESTION ONE

30 marks — suggested time: 54 minutes

FACTS

Elise Montfort and Adrian Bellamy were married for eleven years. They separated two years ago and were divorced last year.

They have two children:

• Celia, age 13; and

• Noah, age 8.

The family has lived in Guelph, Ontario, since Celia was three.

Following separation, Elise and Adrian negotiated a parenting plan that was incorporated into a parenting order under the Divorce Act.

The children spend alternating weeks with each parent.

The order provides that Elise and Adrian share major decision-making responsibility concerning:

• education;

• non-emergency health care;

• significant extracurricular activities; and

• religious upbringing.

Both parents have substantially complied with the order.

The proposed move

Elise works as a senior environmental consultant.

Her current position requires frequent overnight travel throughout southwestern Ontario. She earns approximately $108,000 per year.

She has now been offered a position in Ottawa paying $162,000 per year.

The new position would involve substantially less travel and permit her to work from home three days per week.

Elise has also been in a relationship for eighteen months with Luc Renard, who lives in Ottawa with his own two children.

Elise proposes to relocate to Ottawa with Celia and Noah.

She gives Adrian formal written notice 63 days before the proposed move.

The notice contains:

• the proposed Ottawa address;

• the proposed moving date;

• the reason for the relocation; and

• a proposed revised parenting schedule.

Adrian delivers a written objection 17 days later.

The proposed parenting schedule

Elise proposes that the children reside primarily with her during the school year.

Adrian would have:

• one long weekend each month;

• half of the winter and March school breaks;

• alternating Thanksgiving and Easter weekends;

• six weeks each summer; and

• video calls whenever reasonably requested.

Elise offers to pay approximately 70% of the children's transportation expenses between Guelph and Ottawa.

She says the Ottawa job would allow her to be:

“far more physically available to the children than I am under my current travel schedule.”

Adrian is a self-employed architect.

His income varies between $115,000 and $140,000.

He works primarily from a home office and has considerable flexibility to attend:

• school events;

• medical appointments;

• sports practices; and

• extracurricular activities.

Adrian's parents live fifteen minutes away.

They see the children several times each week.

Noah plays hockey with the same local team he has been on for three seasons.

Celia attends a secondary school with a strong music program and has a close group of friends.

Celia's position

Celia tells the family counsellor:

“I think I want to move to Ottawa.”

She is interested in a specialized performing-arts program available near Elise's proposed home.

She also likes Luc and his children.

Later in the interview, however, Celia says:

“I don't want Dad thinking I'm choosing Mom. I still want to see him all the time.”

She also reports:

“Mom says Ottawa could be our chance to get away from Dad always trying to control everything.”

The counsellor does not express an opinion about whether Celia has been influenced by either parent.

Noah's position

Noah says:

“I don't want to move. My team is here and Grandpa picks me up from school on Thursdays.”

He also says he wants to continue spending:

“the same amount of time with Mom and Dad.”

The parties' relationship

During the marriage, Adrian:

• insisted that Elise provide him with the passwords to their joint bank and credit-card accounts;

• regularly questioned purchases exceeding $100;

• used the family's location-sharing application to monitor where Elise was;

• sometimes sent ten or fifteen messages in an hour if she did not respond;

• discouraged her from travelling socially without him; and

• on two occasions told her that, if she left the marriage, he would make sure the children understood that she had “broken up the family.”

There is no allegation that Adrian physically assaulted Elise or the children.

Since separation, Adrian has generally complied with the parenting order.

However, he continues to send Elise numerous messages about:

• where she is;

• who is present when the children are with her;

• whether Luc sleeps at her home; and

• how she spends money on the children.

On one occasion, after Elise refused to answer questions about Luc, Adrian wrote:

“You don't get to hide things from me when my children are involved.”

Elise says these communications leave her anxious and make joint decision-making difficult.

Adrian says:

“She calls any disagreement controlling. I ask questions because we share responsibility for our children.”

He notes that there have been no police charges, restraining orders or findings of family violence.

Adrian's response to the relocation

Adrian argues that the move would:

• fundamentally alter the equal parenting arrangement;

• reduce him from an ordinary weekday parent to a long-distance parent;

• remove the children from their school and extended family;

• and particularly harm Noah.

He also argues:

“Elise admitted that if the court refuses the relocation, she will probably stay in Guelph because she isn't willing to move without the children. That proves the relocation isn't necessary.”

Elise responds that whether she would personally move without the children should not decide what is in the children's best interests.

QUESTION

Advise Elise and Adrian concerning whether the proposed relocation should be authorized.

Address the applicable Divorce Act framework, the significance of the existing equal parenting arrangement, the children's views, the allegations of coercive or controlling conduct, and the parties' respective relocation proposals.

30 MARKS

THE BRICKAM EXPLANATION — QUESTION ONE

1. The Relocation Question Is Ultimately a Best-Interests Inquiry

The court does not begin by deciding:

“Which parent has the better reason for moving?”

The governing question is whether the proposed relocation is in the best interests of Celia and Noah.

Under the current Divorce Act, the child's best interests are the only consideration in making a parenting order.

The court gives primary consideration to the child's:

• physical safety;

• emotional safety;

• psychological safety;

• security; and

• well-being.

The relocation provisions supplement rather than replace that framework.

2. There Is No General Presumption for or Against Relocation

Neither parent receives an automatic advantage merely because:

• Elise is the parent seeking to move;

• Adrian is the parent seeking to preserve the status quo;

• Elise has a significant employment opportunity;

• or Adrian currently exercises substantial parenting time.

The legislation creates specific burden rules in certain parenting arrangements, but the ultimate inquiry remains individualized.

Barendregt v. Grebliunas confirms that relocation cases demand a fact-specific examination of the child's actual circumstances.

Notice and Objection

3. Elise Appears to Have Complied With the Relocation Notice Requirement

She gave formal written notice more than 60 days before the proposed relocation.

The notice included:

• timing;

• destination;

• reasons; and

• a proposed revised parenting arrangement.

Adrian objected within 30 days.

The dispute therefore proceeds to judicial determination rather than becoming a relocation that may occur without a formal challenge.

There is no obvious procedural default by either parent.

The Existing Parenting Arrangement

4. The Equal Parenting Arrangement Has Major Legal Significance

Celia and Noah currently spend alternating weeks with each parent.

Both parents have substantially complied with that arrangement.

This is not a situation where one parent has historically exercised only occasional parenting time.

The move would transform Adrian's role from approximately half of the children's ordinary daily care to:

• monthly long weekends;

• holiday blocks; and

• summer parenting.

That is a fundamental practical change.

5. Elise Bears the Applicable Relocation Burden

The children presently spend substantially equal parenting time with each parent.

Where the statutory conditions are met for such an arrangement, the parent proposing the relocation bears the burden of establishing that the relocation would be in the children's best interests.

That does not create a legal presumption that children in equal-time arrangements can never move.

It does mean that Elise must affirmatively establish the proposed relocation as being in Celia's and Noah's best interests.

Elise's Reasons for Moving

6. The Employment Opportunity Is Legitimate and Material

The proposed position offers:

• approximately $54,000 more annual income;

• substantially less overnight travel;

• three work-from-home days per week; and

• greater predictable availability.

Those are not trivial benefits.

The improved schedule may directly benefit the children by increasing Elise's actual availability.

Her relationship with Luc also forms part of the real circumstances in which the family would live.

The court should not reduce her reasons to:

“she wants to live with her boyfriend.”

7. The Court May Consider the Reasons, But the Reasons Are Not Themselves Decisive

The statutory relocation framework permits consideration of why a relocation is proposed.

A legitimate employment opportunity can support a move.

But even a sensible adult reason does not answer whether:

• uprooting the children;

• changing schools;

• reducing time with Adrian; and

• altering extended-family relationships

is in the children's interests.

Likewise, a court should not treat a parent's wish to form a new household as inherently improper.

Adrian's Relationship With the Children

8. Adrian Is a Highly Involved Parent

His strongest facts are not merely that he loves the children.

He actually participates in their ordinary lives.

His flexible employment permits him to attend:

• appointments;

• school events;

• practices;

• and routine weekday activities.

His parents also provide regular family support.

Moving 450 kilometres away would make the current form of parenting impossible.

9. Virtual Contact Is Not Equivalent to Ordinary Parenting Time

Elise's proposed schedule is meaningful.

It does preserve substantial:

• summer;

• holiday;

• long-weekend; and

• electronic contact.

But a court should realistically recognize the qualitative difference between:

helping with homework on Tuesday, attending a Thursday practice and taking a child to school

and

concentrated holiday parenting several weeks later.

That change matters considerably in an equal-time case.

Celia's Views

10. Celia's Views Matter but Do Not Determine the Outcome

At 13, Celia is sufficiently mature that her views deserve meaningful weight.

She identifies real reasons for preferring Ottawa:

• the performing-arts program;

• her positive relationship with Luc's family;

• and apparent attraction to the new environment.

Those are not irrational or superficial.

11. The Court Should Examine How Firm and Independent Her Preference Is

Celia also says:

“I don't want Dad thinking I'm choosing Mom.”

and reports Elise's characterization that Ottawa is a chance to:

“get away from Dad.”

That does not mean Elise has improperly manipulated her.

But it cautions against treating the statement:

“I think I want to move”

as a simple, fixed instruction to the court.

The child's views should be understood in context, including:

• age;

• maturity;

• consistency;

• strength of preference;

• reasons;

• and possible influence.

12. Celia Does Not Have to Choose Between Her Parents

A relocation proceeding should not convert a 13-year-old into the decision-maker.

Her preference is one component of the best-interests inquiry.

The responsibility for deciding the case remains with the court.

Noah's Views

13. Noah's Opposition Is Also Relevant

At age eight, Noah's wishes may receive somewhat less weight than Celia's, depending on maturity.

But his reasons are concrete:

• hockey;

• grandparents;

• school;

• and maintaining equal time with both parents.

His preference therefore should not be dismissed simply because he is younger.

14. The Same Relocation May Affect the Two Children Differently

A sophisticated analysis should resist treating:

“the children”

as though their interests are identical.

Celia sees an educational and social opportunity in Ottawa.

Noah appears more closely attached to his existing routine.

The desirability of keeping siblings together is important, but the court must still recognize the different impact upon each child.

Family Violence

15. The Absence of Physical Assault Does Not End the Family-Violence Inquiry

The Divorce Act definition of family violence is broader than physical violence.

A pattern of:

• controlling finances;

• monitoring location;

• repeated messaging;

• threats concerning the children's perception of separation;

• intrusive questioning; and

• other coercive conduct

may potentially constitute family violence.

The court should therefore not say:

“There are no criminal charges, so family violence is irrelevant.”

16. Coercive and Controlling Behaviour Can Be Particularly Important

The legislation specifically requires attention to relevant characteristics of family violence, including patterns of coercive and controlling behaviour.

That matters because such conduct can continue after separation and influence:

• the victimized parent's autonomy;

• communication;

• joint decision-making;

• the children's emotional environment; and

• the feasibility of future parenting arrangements.

17. Elise Has a Serious Argument That Adrian's Conduct Must Be Examined as a Pattern

Any single message might appear innocuous.

The legal significance can change when the court considers the entire pattern:

• financial monitoring during marriage;

• location tracking;

• repeated demands for immediate responses;

• discouraging social independence;

• threats about blaming Elise for the family breakdown; and

• continuing questioning after separation.

The pattern may be more probative than any isolated event.

18. Adrian Has Legitimate Counterarguments

Adrian can point out that:

• there has been no allegation of physical violence;

• he has complied with the parenting schedule;

• there is no suggestion that he has harmed the children;

• parents sharing decision-making legitimately require information about matters affecting children;

• and some of his post-separation questions may concern parenting rather than control.

The court should distinguish proper parental communication from coercive monitoring.

The label used by either parent is not decisive.

19. The Important Question Is the Effect on Parenting and the Children

Even if the court finds family violence, the analysis does not become:

“Adrian behaved badly toward Elise, therefore Elise may relocate.”

The statutory inquiry considers matters such as:

• the nature and seriousness of the conduct;

• frequency;

• whether there is a pattern of coercive control;

• whether the children are exposed to it;

• whether it causes fear;

• its effect on parenting capacity; and

• whether it impairs the ability to cooperate on matters concerning the children.

Evidence that Adrian's conduct undermines functional joint parenting materially strengthens Elise's relocation argument.

Stability and Existing Relationships

20. Guelph Provides Significant Continuity

Remaining in Guelph preserves:

• the present school environment;

• equal parenting;

• regular grandparent involvement;

• Noah's hockey;

• Celia's friendships; and

• the children's established community.

Continuity is particularly significant because there is no suggestion that the current arrangement is failing from the children's perspective.

21. Ottawa Also Offers Meaningful Advantages

The proposed move is not simply a loss of existing relationships.

Potential benefits include:

• Elise's substantially improved employment conditions;

• greater maternal availability;

• a higher household income;

• a performing-arts opportunity for Celia;

• and a developing blended-family relationship.

The court must compare actual proposed arrangements rather than idealizing the status quo.

Elise's Proposed Schedule

22. Elise Has Made a Serious Effort to Preserve Adrian's Relationship

Offering:

• regular long weekends;

• substantial summer time;

• divided school holidays;

• electronic contact; and

• most transportation expenses

strengthens her position.

It shows an attempt to maintain the children's relationship with Adrian.

23. But Geography Creates an Irreducible Loss

No schedule can transform Ottawa and Guelph into neighbouring communities.

A move of this distance necessarily eliminates:

• alternate-week parenting;

• spontaneous contact;

• routine midweek involvement;

• and much of Adrian's participation in ordinary school life.

The court must confront that cost directly.

Adrian's “She Would Stay Anyway” Argument

24. The Court Should Not Resolve the Case Through the Double-Bind Question

Adrian argues:

“If Elise would stay when permission is refused, the move cannot be necessary.”

That is not the proper legal approach.

The relocation provisions prevent the court from deciding the case by asking whether the relocating parent would:

• move without the children if relocation is refused; or

• remain behind if the children cannot accompany them.

The purpose is to avoid forcing the relocating parent into a tactical answer that distorts the best-interests analysis.

The court should evaluate the proposed relocation itself.

Overall Advice

25. This Is a Genuinely Difficult Relocation Case

Elise has meaningful factors supporting relocation:

• a significant career improvement;

• reduced work travel;

• potentially greater availability;

• Celia's qualified preference;

• a thoughtful alternative parenting proposal; and

• evidence potentially supporting a finding of coercive control.

Adrian has equally serious factors opposing it:

• true equal parenting;

• strong daily involvement;

• the children's established community;

• extended-family support;

• Noah's clear opposition;

• Celia's ambivalence about losing ordinary contact with him; and

• the substantial reduction in his day-to-day role.

26. Elise Faces a Significant Burden Because of the Existing Equal-Time Arrangement

On the present facts, authorization is far from assured.

If the court concludes that Adrian's conduct constitutes significant continuing coercive control that materially impairs the existing parenting arrangement or the children's well-being, Elise's case strengthens substantially.

If the conduct is found less serious and the current equal-time arrangement is functioning well for the children, the disruption associated with relocation may carry greater weight.

A reasoned answer may reach either conclusion, but it must be grounded in the statutory best-interests and relocation framework rather than in a parental entitlement to move or remain.

Brickam’s Suggested Marking Approach — Question One

Issue	Marks
Governing best-interests framework and absence of an automatic relocation presumption	4
Notice, objection and identification of the burden arising from substantially equal parenting time	4
Application of relocation factors, including reasons for move, existing relationships and proposed parenting arrangements	6
Family violence/coercive-control analysis and its connection to parenting rather than marital fault	5
Celia's views: age, maturity, ambivalence and possible influence	3
Noah's views and recognition that the move may affect the two children differently	2
Effect of relocation on Adrian's ordinary parenting and adequacy of Elise's proposed schedule	3
Recognition that Elise's hypothetical decision to stay or move without the children should not determine the case	1
Reasoned overall conclusion	2
TOTAL	30

QUESTION TWO

25 marks — suggested time: 45 minutes

FACTS

Soraya Nadeau and Marek Hollis divorced in 2020.

They have two children:

• Amélie, now 15; and

• Jonas, now 11.

A 2020 consent order requires Marek to pay child support.

At that time:

• Soraya earned $88,000 per year;

• Marek earned $145,000 per year.

The order also requires the parties to exchange income information annually by June 1.

The children presently spend approximately 43% of their parenting time with Marek and 57% with Soraya.

Neither party disputes that this has been the actual arrangement for the past three years.

Marek's increased earnings

Marek worked in institutional software sales.

His total income was:

• $193,000 in 2021;

• $211,000 in 2022; and

• $226,000 in 2023.

A significant portion consisted of performance bonuses.

Marek did not provide Soraya with his complete tax returns during those years.

In June 2022, Soraya emailed him:

“Your support is still based on $145,000. Please send your full return and Notice of Assessment so we can update it.”

Marek sent a letter from his employer identifying his base salary as $151,000.

He wrote:

“The rest is unpredictable bonus money. I don't think support should be recalculated every time I have one good year.”

Soraya did not commence proceedings then.

She says she could not afford a lawyer and assumed Marek would eventually provide the required information.

In 2023 she asked again.

Marek did not respond.

Marek changes careers

In January 2024, Marek resigned.

He opened a small cycling-tour company.

He says he had become:

“completely burned out from corporate sales”

and had wanted to build an outdoor-tourism business for years.

He invested approximately $190,000 of his own savings into the company.

The business paid him employment income of:

• $63,000 in 2024; and

• an annualized rate of approximately $78,000 in 2025.

The business is growing, but it has not yet generated significant profit.

Six months after his resignation, Marek's previous employer offered him a similar position paying a base salary of $175,000 plus commissions.

He declined.

He says:

“I'm entitled to choose a career I can actually tolerate.”

Soraya responds:

“He is entitled to change careers, but the children should not finance that decision.”

Current parenting costs

Because each parent maintains a home large enough for both children, Marek says that simply comparing the Guideline table amounts would overstate what he should pay.

Soraya says:

“Forty-three percent is barely over the line. I still pay for most school clothes, school lunches, phones and ordinary activities.”

Amélie has been seeing a registered psychologist following significant anxiety symptoms.

Her annual therapy cost is approximately $6,000.

Soraya's benefits reimburse $1,500.

Marek does not dispute that the therapy was recommended by Amélie's physician.

Jonas plays competitive hockey.

The annual cost is now approximately $12,000.

Before separation, the family regularly spent approximately $5,000 to $6,000 each year on his hockey and related training.

Marek says the present elite-level program is:

“a luxury chosen by Soraya.”

Soraya says Jonas has progressed significantly and both parents encouraged him to try out.

The application

In January 2025, Soraya applies for:

1. increased ongoing child support;

2. retroactive adjustment of support for prior years;

3. contribution to Amélie's therapy expenses;

4. contribution to Jonas's hockey expenses; and

5. an order imputing income to Marek above his present $78,000 salary.

Marek argues that:

• shared parenting substantially reduces his table obligation;

• Soraya waited too long to bring the claim;

• past bonuses should not be revisited;

• and his present income reflects a legitimate career change rather than underemployment.

QUESTION

Advise Soraya and Marek concerning the current and retroactive child-support issues.

Address the shared-parenting arrangement, Marek's historical and present income, the delayed disclosure, and the proposed expenses for Amélie and Jonas.

25 MARKS

THE BRICKAM EXPLANATION — QUESTION TWO

1. Child Support Must Be Broken Into Separate Questions

The dispute raises at least five analytically distinct matters:

1. current income;

2. shared-parenting support;

3. retroactive adjustment;

4. special or extraordinary expenses; and

5. intentional underemployment.

They should not be collapsed into a general inquiry into what amount seems fair.

Shared Parenting

2. The 40% Threshold Is Satisfied

Under s. 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, the special shared-parenting analysis applies where each parent exercises at least 40% of parenting time over the course of a year.

Marek exercises approximately 43%.

The fact that this is only slightly above the threshold does not permit the court simply to ignore s. 9.

3. Section 9 Does Not Create an Automatic Straight Set-Off

Under Contino v. Leonelli-Contino, the court does more than mechanically:

calculate each table amount and subtract the lower from the higher.

The statutory inquiry considers:

• the table amounts payable by each parent;

• the increased costs associated with shared parenting; and

• the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each parent and the children.

The table set-off is an important starting point, not necessarily the final answer.

4. Marek Has Genuine Shared-Parenting Costs

He maintains:

• appropriate housing;

• food;

• transportation;

• utilities;

• and other costs

for the children during 43% of their time.

Those costs matter.

Soraya cannot simply treat him as an occasional-access parent.

5. Soraya's Greater Day-to-Day Expenditures Also Matter

If she actually bears disproportionately large costs for:

• clothing;

• school expenses;

• phones;

• routine activities; and

• other non-duplicated expenses,

those circumstances may support an amount different from a bare set-off.

The inquiry should examine actual family economics rather than assuming all expenses follow the parenting-time percentages exactly.

Marek's Historical Income

6. Support Was Based on Materially Outdated Income

The original support level was based on $145,000.

His actual annual income subsequently reached:

• $193,000;

• $211,000; and

• $226,000.

Those are substantial differences.

Child support ordinarily responds to actual annual income rather than being permanently frozen at the figure used in an earlier order.

7. Bonus Income Is Not Automatically Ignored Because It Fluctuates

The fact that some compensation was performance-based does not make it legally irrelevant.

Variable income may require:

• annual recalculation;

• averaging in an appropriate case;

• or another method producing a fair current-income figure.

Marek's position that bonus income simply does not count is too broad.

Disclosure

8. Marek's Failure to Provide Complete Information Is Legally Significant

The order expressly required annual disclosure.

Soraya requested:

• his full return; and

• his Notice of Assessment.

Marek instead produced only a base-salary letter.

That concealed the true magnitude of his income.

Financial disclosure is fundamental to the proper operation of child-support obligations.

9. Colucci Emphasizes the Importance of Full and Timely Disclosure

Colucci v. Colucci strongly reinforces that a support payor cannot benefit from failing to disclose income and then rely upon the recipient's inability to discover the true amount.

Although the specific procedural posture of cases may differ, the broader principle is important:

child support depends upon accurate financial information, and non-disclosure weighs heavily against the party responsible for it.

Marek's conduct materially weakens his reliance on delay.

Retroactive Child Support

10. Soraya's June 2022 Request Is Important

She expressly told Marek:

“Your support is still based on $145,000.”

and requested the financial information necessary to update it.

That provides strong evidence of actual notice that increased support was being sought.

11. The Court Is Not Limited to a Mechanical Notice Rule

Retroactive child-support analysis remains discretionary and contextual.

Relevant considerations include:

• why the recipient delayed;

• the payor's conduct;

• the child's circumstances;

• hardship associated with a retroactive award;

• and when the payor had effective notice.

Here Soraya says:

• she could not afford counsel;

• she sought disclosure;

• and Marek did not provide it.

Those facts are materially different from a parent simply doing nothing for years despite full knowledge of the income.

12. Marek's Non-Disclosure May Support Reaching Further Back

His strongest response is that he arranged his finances for years in reliance on the existing order and that a large retroactive award may create hardship.

But the force of reliance is reduced where he knew:

• income had risen significantly;

• annual disclosure was mandatory;

• and Soraya had requested an adjustment.

A court should be reluctant to let non-disclosure create the very delay upon which the non-disclosing parent later relies.

13. Michel v. Graydon Reinforces the Child-Centred Nature of Retroactive Support

Michel v. Graydon rejects an unduly technical approach that would deprive children of support properly owing merely because of the passage of time or procedural timing.

The underlying entitlement belongs to the child.

Soraya therefore has a strong retroactive claim.

The precise commencement date and amount would require a year-by-year assessment of Marek's proper Guideline income and the applicable shared-parenting analysis.

Marek's Career Change

14. The Court Cannot Simply Treat Marek's $78,000 Salary as Conclusive

Under s. 19 of the Guidelines, income may be imputed where a spouse is intentionally underemployed or unemployed unless the reduction is justified by specified reasonable circumstances.

The word “intentionally” does not require proof that Marek acted in bad faith for the purpose of defeating child support.

Drygala v. Pauli makes that distinction important.

A voluntary employment decision can engage the provision.

15. But Parents Are Not Permanently Locked Into Their Highest-Paying Career

Marek has substantial facts supporting the legitimacy of his decision:

• prolonged dissatisfaction;

• a pre-existing interest in the business;

• a major personal investment;

• actual ongoing work;

• and evidence that the new company is operating rather than being a sham.

Family law does not generally require someone to remain indefinitely in intolerable employment solely because it pays more.

16. The Children's Right to Support Still Limits Career Freedom

Marek also has adverse facts:

• income fell from more than $200,000 to under $80,000;

• the change was entirely voluntary;

• he declined an offer worth substantially more;

• and the children's needs continued.

The question is not whether cycling tourism is a respectable career.

It is whether it is reasonable to make the children bear the financial consequences of this particular reduction.

17. The Prior Job Offer Is Powerful Evidence of Earning Capacity

A concrete offer of:

• $175,000 base salary;

• plus commissions

is much more probative than speculation that Marek could theoretically earn more.

It provides a real benchmark for available earning capacity.

The court need not necessarily impute his former peak $226,000 income.

But an imputed figure materially above $78,000 is a serious possibility.

18. The Court Should Assess Reasonableness Rather Than Punish Marek

The purpose is proper support.

It is not to punish him for becoming an entrepreneur.

Relevant considerations include:

• his historical earnings;

• current opportunities;

• the genuine prospects of the new business;

• the duration of reduced income;

• the children's needs; and

• the reasonableness of the decision in the family's circumstances.

Amélie's Therapy

19. The Therapy Has a Strong Claim to Treatment Under Section 7

The treatment:

• responds to a real health need;

• was recommended by a physician;

• costs $6,000 annually;

• and is only partly reimbursed.

The unreimbursed portion is therefore a strong candidate for a special or extraordinary health-related expense.

20. The Expense Should Be Calculated Net of Reimbursement

The $1,500 paid through benefits should not simply be ignored.

The relevant net expense is approximately $4,500, subject to any additional tax or reimbursement adjustments required by the Guidelines.

The parents would ordinarily share the appropriate net expense proportionately to their incomes after taking account of relevant contributions.

Jonas's Hockey

21. Hockey Requires a More Contextual Section 7 Analysis

Not every extracurricular expense is automatically a s. 7 expense merely because a child enjoys the activity.

The court considers matters such as:

• necessity in relation to the child's best interests;

• reasonableness in relation to parental means;

• the family's historical spending pattern;

• the child's demonstrated commitment and ability;

• and the overall circumstances.

22. The Pre-Separation History Supports Soraya

This family already spent approximately $5,000 to $6,000 annually on Jonas's hockey.

Both parents encouraged his continued participation.

The current program is therefore not entirely new.

That supports continuity.

23. The Increase to $12,000 Gives Marek a Real Argument

The cost has roughly doubled.

A court need not assume that every escalation in competitive sport becomes a mandatory extraordinary expense.

Soraya would need to justify:

• why the elite program is appropriate;

• whether comparable lower-cost alternatives exist;

• and whether the expense remains proportionate to the parents' means.

If Marek's proper income remains high or is imputed materially upward, the reasonableness argument for the expense becomes stronger.

Overall Advice

24. Soraya Has a Strong Claim for Reassessment

The court should determine Marek's income year by year rather than rely upon the original $145,000 figure.

His failure to provide ordered disclosure substantially strengthens Soraya's retroactive claim.

25. The Shared-Parenting Arrangement Matters but Does Not Eliminate Support

Because both parents exceed the 40% threshold, s. 9 applies.

But the result should reflect:

• both table amounts;

• duplicated costs;

• non-duplicated costs;

• and the parties' actual means and circumstances.

26. Present Income Is the Most Contested Issue

Marek's business is genuine.

His career change therefore should not be dismissed as a sham.

Nevertheless, the dramatic voluntary reduction in earnings and the concrete high-paying job he declined create a substantial basis to impute income.

27. The Two Section 7 Expenses Are Not Equally Strong

Amélie's medically recommended therapy is the stronger claim.

Jonas's hockey is arguable and requires closer examination of:

• historical family spending;

• current level;

• parental means;

• and reasonableness.

Brickam’s Suggested Marking Approach — Question Two

Issue	Marks
Shared-parenting threshold and proper s. 9 / Contino analysis rather than automatic set-off	5
Historical income, treatment of variable bonus income and need for annual adjustment	3
Financial disclosure, Marek's incomplete response and significance of non-disclosure	3
Retroactive support: effective notice, delay, payor conduct, Michel/Colucci principles and year-by-year consequences	5
Intentional underemployment/imputation under s. 19 and application of Drygala to the career change and job offer	5
Amélie's therapy as a special or extraordinary expense and treatment of reimbursement	2
Jonas's hockey: historical spending, reasonableness and extraordinary-expense analysis	1
Overall reasoned conclusion	1
TOTAL	25

QUESTION THREE

25 marks — suggested time: 45 minutes

FACTS

Coralie Winslow and Brennan Colebrook married in 2011.

For purposes of this question, assume that June 30, 2025 is the valuation date under the Ontario Family Law Act.

They have one child, Mira, age 10.

The matrimonial home

Coralie and Brennan are registered as equal joint owners of the matrimonial home.

As of the valuation date:

• the property is worth $1.4 million;

• the mortgage balance is $500,000; and

• total equity is therefore approximately $900,000.

In 2018, Coralie inherited $240,000 from her aunt.

Her aunt's will simply left the money to Coralie personally. It contained no special provision concerning income earned from the inheritance.

Coralie used:

• $200,000 to pay down the mortgage and finance a major addition to the matrimonial home; and

• $40,000 to purchase investments held in an account solely in her name.

The separate investment account is now worth $55,000.

Coralie says:

“The entire $240,000 came from my aunt, so all of it should be excluded from equalization.”

Other property

On the valuation date Coralie owns:

• her one-half interest in the home equity: $450,000;

• pension and retirement assets: $300,000;

• ordinary savings and investments: $120,000;

• the separate inherited investment account: $55,000.

She has ordinary personal debts of $20,000.

Coralie had no material property or debt on the date of marriage.

Brennan owns:

• his one-half interest in the home equity: $450,000;

• shares in his consulting corporation: $500,000;

• retirement assets: $200,000;

• cash and ordinary investments: $50,000.

His liabilities on the valuation date total $220,000.

Of that amount:

• $40,000 consists of ordinary personal debt; and

• $180,000 arises from leveraged cryptocurrency trading undertaken during the final five months of the marriage.

Brennan owned a non-registered investment portfolio worth $150,000 on the date of marriage.

That portfolio was later sold.

None of the funds can now be traced into a particular current asset.

The cryptocurrency losses

During the last year of the marriage, the spouses argued frequently about money.

Without telling Coralie, Brennan borrowed $180,000 through personal credit facilities and used it to make highly leveraged cryptocurrency trades.

He initially made approximately $60,000.

He then increased the positions substantially.

By the valuation date, the borrowed money and his gains had been lost.

Text messages to a friend include:

“One big win and I can retire before Coralie even knows I borrowed it.”

and later:

“I doubled down. If this goes wrong I'm cooked.”

Brennan says:

“It was an investment. Lots of investments lose money. The debt existed on valuation day and has to count.”

Coralie says it would be unconscionable if his secret speculation reduced his net family property and required her to make an equalization payment to him.

The home after separation

Coralie has remained in the matrimonial home with Mira.

Brennan rented an apartment nearby.

Three months after separation, Brennan entered the house while Coralie and Mira were away and changed the exterior locks.

He emailed Coralie:

“I'm half owner. I have as much right to the house as you do. You can arrange a time to pick up your things.”

Coralie had the locks changed again the following day and resumed occupying the home.

Brennan now wants the house listed immediately.

Coralie refuses.

She says Mira is already struggling with the separation and should remain in the home until the end of the school year.

Brennan says:

• he cannot afford both the mortgage contribution and his apartment indefinitely;

• his business records and home office remain in the house;

• and Coralie can rent a smaller property in the same neighbourhood.

No allegation of physical violence is made.

Coralie seeks:

1. equalization;

2. an unequal division if necessary because of the cryptocurrency losses;

3. an order preventing Brennan from selling or encumbering the home without her consent; and

4. exclusive possession of the home for a temporary period.

QUESTION

Advise Coralie and Brennan concerning the principal Ontario property-law issues arising from these facts.

Your answer should address the inheritance, the net family property calculations, Brennan's cryptocurrency debt, and the parties' respective rights concerning the matrimonial home.

25 MARKS

THE BRICKAM EXPLANATION — QUESTION THREE

1. Ownership, Net Family Property and Possession Must Be Kept Separate

This problem deliberately places several Ontario property concepts beside one another.

A correct analysis should not assume that:

• title determines equalization;

• equalization changes title automatically;

• excluded property is always removed merely because it originated from an inheritance;

• or ownership of a matrimonial home gives one spouse a unilateral right to exclude the other.

The Family Law Act deals with these questions through different provisions.

Net Family Property

2. Each Spouse Calculates Net Family Property Separately

Under Part I of the Family Law Act, each spouse generally determines the value of property owned on the valuation date, after relevant liabilities, deductions and exclusions.

The spouse with the greater net family property ordinarily owes one-half of the difference to the spouse with the lesser net family property.

The equalization scheme does not simply pool every asset and divide each item in half.

Coralie's Inheritance

3. Inheritances From Third Parties Acquired During Marriage Are Potentially Excluded

Property acquired by inheritance from a third person after marriage may fall within the statutory excluded-property regime.

Property into which excluded property can be traced may also retain that treatment, subject to the statutory matrimonial-home exception.

The claimant bears the practical burden of establishing the exclusion.

4. The $55,000 Separate Account Has a Strong Claim to Exclusion

Coralie placed $40,000 of the inheritance into a distinct investment account.

It remains identifiable and is now worth $55,000.

The facts do not suggest that:

• Brennan contributed to it;

• the account became joint property; or

• the funds were mixed beyond identification.

Accordingly, the current value of that traceable inherited property has a strong claim to exclusion.

5. The $200,000 Used for the Matrimonial Home Is Different

Coralie cannot simply say:

“It began as inheritance, therefore it remains excluded forever.”

She used the $200,000 to:

• reduce the mortgage; and

• improve the matrimonial home.

The statutory excluded-property regime specifically treats the matrimonial home differently.

An inheritance traced into a matrimonial home does not receive the same exclusion that would generally apply to another traceable asset.

6. The Statutory Result Can Be Harsh Without Being an Error

Coralie may understandably regard the result as unfair because the money came entirely from her aunt.

But the legislature deliberately gives the matrimonial home distinctive treatment.

The court should not create an exclusion merely because the inherited contribution was large.

Her current one-half share of the home's equity enters her property calculation in the ordinary way.

Brennan's Date-of-Marriage Portfolio

7. Brennan Does Not Have to Trace the Old Portfolio Into a Current Asset to Claim the Ordinary Date-of-Marriage Deduction

The date-of-marriage deduction performs a different function from tracing excluded property.

Brennan owned $150,000 of ordinary investment property when the marriage began.

It was not a matrimonial home.

Subject to proof of its value and any relevant debts at the time, he may deduct the qualifying net value of property owned on the date of marriage.

The later sale of that portfolio does not, by itself, eliminate the historical deduction.

Approximate NFP Calculations

8. Coralie's Approximate NFP Is $850,000

Her valuation-date property is approximately:

• home equity interest: $450,000;

• pension/retirement property: $300,000;

• ordinary savings: $120,000;

• inherited account: $55,000.

Total: $925,000.

Less ordinary debt of $20,000 gives:

$905,000.

Excluding the traceable $55,000 inherited investment gives an approximate NFP of:

$850,000.

No date-of-marriage deduction is identified.

9. Brennan's Approximate NFP Is $830,000 if the Cryptocurrency Debt Is Treated in the Ordinary Way

His property totals:

• home equity interest: $450,000;

• corporation shares: $500,000;

• retirement assets: $200,000;

• cash/investments: $50,000.

Total:

$1.2 million.

Less $220,000 liabilities:

$980,000.

Less the $150,000 date-of-marriage deduction:

$830,000.

On those ordinary calculations, Coralie's NFP exceeds Brennan's by approximately $20,000.

She would therefore owe approximately $10,000 in equalization.

10. That Counterintuitive Result Creates the Section 5(6) Issue

The reason Brennan's NFP has fallen below Coralie's is materially connected to the $180,000 debt generated through secret speculative trading.

That does not mean the court should falsify the NFP arithmetic.

Instead, the statutory unequal-division provision becomes relevant.

Unequal Division

11. Unequal Division Requires More Than Ordinary Unfairness

Section 5(6) does not authorize a general:

“whatever seems fair”

redistribution.

The statutory threshold is unconscionability.

That is deliberately demanding.

Equalization may produce an unpleasant or even significantly unfair-looking result without automatically satisfying the test.

12. Recklessly Incurred Debt and Reckless Depletion Are Specifically Important

The statute expressly directs attention to circumstances including:

• debts or liabilities recklessly incurred; and

• intentional or reckless depletion of net family property.

Coralie therefore has more than a generalized fairness complaint.

Her allegations fit recognized statutory considerations.

13. Brennan Can Legitimately Say That Risky Investments Are Not Automatically Reckless

People routinely:

• borrow to invest;

• lose money;

• make poor predictions; and

• suffer market losses.

Family courts should not retrospectively classify every unsuccessful investment as misconduct merely because the marriage later ended.

If Brennan had made a commercially plausible investment after reasonable investigation, a loss might simply be part of marital economic life.

14. The Facts Here Are Considerably Worse for Brennan

The trading involved:

• $180,000 of undisclosed borrowing;

• highly leveraged speculation;

• repeated increases in exposure;

• secrecy from Coralie;

• and text messages acknowledging the extreme risk.

His statement:

“I doubled down. If this goes wrong I'm cooked.”

is particularly damaging.

This looks much closer to conscious reckless depletion than an ordinary unsuccessful investment.

15. The Timing Also Matters

The conduct occurred during the final months of a seriously deteriorating marriage.

Timing alone does not establish an attempt to defeat equalization.

But combined with:

• secrecy;

• extraordinary leverage;

• and the magnitude of the potential loss,

it supports Coralie's argument.

16. A Section 5(6) Remedy Does Not Necessarily Mean Deleting the Debt From the Formula

A careful answer should not simply rewrite the statutory NFP calculation as though the $180,000 liability never existed.

The court first calculates NFP under the statute.

It then considers whether ordinary equalization would be unconscionable and whether an unequal division is justified.

The final amount can therefore be adjusted through the statutory remedy rather than through fictional arithmetic.

17. Coralie Has a Strong Unequal-Division Argument

The particularly striking feature is that ordinary equalization may require Coralie to pay Brennan precisely because Brennan secretly incurred and lost $180,000 through highly leveraged speculation.

That is a serious foundation for a s. 5(6) claim.

The high unconscionability threshold must still be acknowledged, but this is substantially stronger than a routine complaint about irresponsible spending.

The Matrimonial Home

18. Equal Right to Possession Is Distinct From Ownership

Both spouses already hold legal title here.

But even if only one were on title, Part II of the Family Law Act gives married spouses equal rights to possession of a matrimonial home while the statutory regime applies.

Brennan therefore could not simply reason:

“I own half, so I may lock Coralie out.”

Coralie likewise cannot derive permanent exclusive ownership merely from remaining in residence.

19. Brennan's Lock Change Was Inconsistent With Coralie's Possessory Rights

Changing the locks and telling Coralie to:

“pick up your things”

attempted to unilaterally terminate her possession.

His ownership interest does not authorize him to do that.

Absent:

• consent;

• an applicable court order;

• or another lawful basis,

both spouses retain possessory rights.

Disposition

20. Brennan Cannot Unilaterally Sell or Encumber the Matrimonial Home

The Family Law Act imposes specific restrictions on disposition or encumbrance of a matrimonial home.

A spouse cannot simply convey or mortgage the home free of the other spouse's statutory rights without:

• the necessary participation or consent; or

• a court order where authorized.

Here Coralie is also a registered joint owner, making Brennan's suggestion of unilateral sale even less realistic.

21. The Court Can Preserve the Property While the Dispute Is Resolved

If there is a real risk of an unauthorized disposition or other transaction prejudicing Coralie's rights, statutory preservation or restraining powers may be available.

That is distinct from finally deciding:

• ownership;

• equalization; or

• sale.

Exclusive Possession

22. Exclusive Possession Is a Temporary Possessory Remedy

Coralie asks to remain in the home with Mira.

An order for exclusive possession does not transfer title.

Brennan would remain an owner.

The question is who may occupy the home during the relevant period.

23. Mira's Best Interests Are Highly Relevant

Mira is ten.

She is already adjusting to the separation.

Coralie seeks only a temporary period through the end of the school year.

Stability in:

• school;

• neighbourhood;

• home;

• and routine

supports her application.

24. Brennan's Financial Circumstances Also Matter

The court cannot ignore his position.

He is:

• contributing toward a costly home;

• also paying rent;

• and says he cannot sustain both indefinitely.

The availability and cost of alternative accommodation to each spouse form part of the analysis.

His business records and home office may also be relevant, though they are unlikely by themselves to determine possession.

25. Exclusive Possession Is Not a Punishment for Changing the Locks

Brennan's conduct may provide evidence concerning the practical need for a clear possession order.

But the remedy should not be awarded simply to punish him.

The court applies the statutory factors, including:

• Mira's interests;

• the parties' financial positions;

• existing obligations;

• available accommodation;

• and any relevant violence or conflict.

No physical violence is alleged here.

26. Coralie Has a Plausible Short-Term Exclusive-Possession Claim

Her request is stronger because:

• Mira is residing with her;

• she seeks stability through a defined school period;

• Brennan already has alternative accommodation; and

• the parties' informal shared possessory rights have already produced a lock-changing confrontation.

That does not mean she is entitled to occupy the property indefinitely.

A later sale, buyout or different arrangement may become appropriate.

Overall Advice

27. The Property Analysis Produces Several Different Results

The likely starting conclusions are:

• the remaining $55,000 inherited account is strongly positioned for exclusion;

• the $200,000 placed into the matrimonial home does not retain the same exclusion;

• Brennan may claim the $150,000 date-of-marriage deduction for his pre-marriage investment property;

• ordinary NFP arithmetic produces approximately $850,000 for Coralie and $830,000 for Brennan;

• ordinary equalization would therefore produce a modest payment from Coralie to Brennan;

• the secret leveraged cryptocurrency losses create a substantial s. 5(6) unequal-division argument;

• neither spouse may unilaterally exclude the other from possession;

• Brennan cannot simply dispose of the matrimonial home on his own; and

• Coralie has a credible claim for temporary exclusive possession, particularly because of Mira's circumstances.

Brickam’s Suggested Marking Approach — Question Three

Issue	Marks
Correct NFP/equalization framework and distinction from title or possession	3
Inheritance: traceable $55,000 exclusion versus loss of exclusion for funds placed into matrimonial home	5
Brennan's $150,000 date-of-marriage deduction and distinction from excluded-property tracing	3
Approximate NFP and ordinary equalization calculation	3
Section 5(6): unconscionability, reckless debt/depletion, Brennan's investment counterargument and application to crypto losses	5
Matrimonial-home equal possession and effect of Brennan's lock change	2
Restriction on disposition/encumbrance and preservation of the home	2
Exclusive possession, Mira's interests, financial circumstances and temporary nature of remedy	2
TOTAL	25

QUESTION FOUR

20 marks — suggested time: 36 minutes

FACTS

Odette Fournier and Graham Telford began living together in 2012.

They never married.

They separated in February 2026 after approximately fourteen years of continuous cohabitation.

They have no children together.

The beginning of the relationship

When the parties began living together, Graham owned a rural property outside Prince Edward County.

The property was registered solely in his name.

At that time:

• its market value was approximately $340,000; and

• the mortgage was approximately $250,000.

Graham operated a small vineyard and seasonal event business from the property.

The business was then worth approximately $180,000.

Odette worked as a restaurant operations manager and earned approximately $82,000 per year.

Odette leaves her employment

Three years into the relationship, Graham's vineyard began hosting:

• weddings;

• corporate events;

• tasting dinners; and

• seasonal festivals.

Graham told Odette:

“If you came into the business full-time, we could actually build something big together.”

Odette resigned from her restaurant position.

For the next eleven years, she worked approximately 35 to 50 hours per week in the vineyard business.

She:

• managed event bookings;

• negotiated with wedding clients;

• performed bookkeeping;

• hired seasonal workers;

• supervised catering;

• developed social-media campaigns;

• and managed relationships with tourism operators.

She received no salary.

The business paid many household expenses, including:

• groceries;

• vehicles;

• vacations; and

• some personal expenses.

Graham says:

“She was fully supported. It isn't true that she worked for nothing.”

Odette says:

“We treated my work as my contribution to what we were building together.”

The property

Odette also spent approximately $72,000 of her personal savings on improvements to the rural property.

The money paid for:

• renovation of the farmhouse kitchen;

• landscaping;

• conversion of an old barn into an event venue; and

• construction of an outdoor ceremony area.

Odette personally managed much of the renovation work.

The converted barn became the vineyard's principal wedding venue.

The rural property is now worth approximately $1.65 million.

The mortgage is $310,000.

Graham remains the sole registered owner.

The business

The vineyard and event company is now valued at approximately $2.4 million.

Graham owns all of its shares.

The parties maintained:

• a joint household account;

• separate personal accounts; and

• no written cohabitation agreement.

They frequently referred to the vineyard as:

“our retirement.”

When discussing expansion with a lender in 2021, Graham stated in Odette's presence:

“Odette and I built this place together.”

The company nevertheless remained entirely in Graham's name.

Separation

Following separation, Graham tells Odette:

“We weren't married. What's mine is mine. You lived here without paying rent for fourteen years and the business paid most of your expenses.”

Odette now has limited personal savings.

At age 49, she has returned to salaried employment but presently earns approximately $58,000 per year.

Graham earns approximately $240,000 annually through salary, dividends and other benefits from the business.

Odette seeks:

1. one-half of the increase in value of Graham's property and business;

2. alternatively, a constructive trust or monetary award based on her contributions; and

3. spousal support.

Graham says:

• Ontario equalization law does not apply because they never married;

• Odette received substantial benefits throughout the relationship;

• much of the increased value came from rising real-estate values and Graham's winemaking expertise;

• and Odette is now self-supporting and should receive no support.

QUESTION

Advise Odette and Graham concerning their respective rights following separation.

Address both the property claims and spousal-support claim.

20 MARKS

THE BRICKAM EXPLANATION — QUESTION FOUR

1. The First Step Is to Separate Statutory Property Rights From Support Rights

Ontario family legislation does not use one universal definition of:

“spouse”

for every purpose.

That distinction is fundamental.

Odette may qualify as a spouse for support purposes while lacking the statutory equalization rights enjoyed by a legally married spouse.

Equalization

2. Odette Does Not Receive Part I Equalization Merely Because the Relationship Lasted Fourteen Years

They never married.

The statutory net family property/equalization regime under Part I of Ontario's Family Law Act applies to married spouses.

A long common-law relationship does not become a marriage for property-equalization purposes simply through passage of time.

Accordingly, Odette cannot say:

“We lived together fourteen years, therefore I automatically receive half the increase in Graham's property.”

That claim fails as a statutory equalization claim.

3. The Same Distinction Applies to Matrimonial-Home Rights

The rural property does not acquire the statutory Part II matrimonial-home regime merely because Odette lived there for fourteen years.

She does not automatically obtain:

• an equal right of possession;

• veto rights over disposition;

• or one-half ownership

through the matrimonial-home provisions applicable to married spouses.

Her property claim must arise elsewhere.

Unjust Enrichment

4. Kerr v. Baranow Provides the Central Framework

Kerr v. Baranow recognizes that unmarried partners may obtain equitable relief where one has been unjustly enriched by the other's contributions.

The basic elements are:

1. enrichment of the defendant;

2. corresponding deprivation of the claimant; and

3. absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment.

The remedy must then be determined.

5. Graham Was Substantially Enriched by Odette's Services

Odette provided more than occasional domestic assistance.

For eleven years she performed significant business functions, including:

• bookings;

• marketing;

• bookkeeping;

• staffing;

• event management;

• catering supervision;

• and tourism development.

Hiring employees or contractors to provide similar services would have cost the business substantial money.

Those uncompensated services therefore represent a strong form of enrichment.

6. The Direct $72,000 Contribution Is Even More Concrete

Odette used her own savings to improve property titled solely to Graham.

The funds contributed directly to:

• the home;

• the event venue;

• landscaping;

• and business infrastructure.

The barn conversion became a revenue-producing part of Graham's business.

That creates an especially clear connection between her deprivation and his assets.

Corresponding Deprivation

7. Odette Experienced Both Direct and Opportunity-Cost Deprivation

Her deprivation includes:

• the $72,000 capital expenditure;

• eleven years of unpaid labour; and

• the career opportunity sacrificed when she left an $82,000 management position.

It is unnecessary to treat the entire foregone salary as an automatic damages calculation.

But the career sacrifice is relevant to understanding the economic consequences of the relationship.

Juristic Reason

8. Graham Will Argue That the Parties' Domestic Arrangement Explains the Benefits

His strongest position is not merely:

“We weren't married.”

He can argue that Odette received substantial reciprocal benefits:

• housing;

• household expenses;

• travel;

• vehicles;

• and lifestyle support.

Those benefits matter when determining whether an enrichment was truly unjust and when quantifying any award.

9. Domestic Relationships Do Not Create a Blanket Presumption That Extensive Unpaid Contributions Were Gifts

The absence of an employment contract does not automatically mean Odette intended:

• eleven years of major business services; and

• $72,000 of capital contributions

as irrevocable gifts to Graham.

The entire relationship must be examined.

Statements such as:

“we could build something big together”

and:

“Odette and I built this place together”

support her contention that the parties understood their efforts as part of a shared economic project.

Joint Family Venture

10. The Joint-Family-Venture Analysis Can Assist in Measuring the Remedy

Kerr identifies factors relevant to determining whether the parties jointly accumulated wealth through a family venture, including:

• mutual effort;

• economic integration;

• actual intent; and

• priority of the family or domestic enterprise.

This is not a separate cause of action.

It is an analytical approach that may assist in valuing an unjust-enrichment remedy.

11. Mutual Effort Strongly Favours Odette

Both parties devoted sustained labour to expanding:

• the vineyard;

• events business;

• and property.

Odette's contributions were not peripheral.

Her responsibilities were directly connected to revenue generation and growth.

12. There Was Significant Economic Integration

The parties maintained some separate accounts.

That helps Graham.

But they also:

• maintained a joint household account;

• used the business to fund household expenses;

• coordinated labour and lifestyle around the enterprise;

• and made long-term plans concerning the same assets.

Complete financial merger is unnecessary before economic integration can exist.

13. Their Words Support an Intention to Build Wealth Together

Repeated references to:

“our retirement”

and Graham's statement that:

“Odette and I built this place together”

are significant.

They do not create legal title.

But they are evidence concerning how the parties understood their economic relationship.

14. Odette Prioritized the Shared Enterprise Over Her Independent Career

She abandoned a stable management position and spent more than a decade advancing the vineyard.

That strongly supports the joint-family-venture analysis.

The Size of the Claim

15. Odette Is Not Automatically Entitled to 50% of the Wealth Increase

The finding of a joint family venture does not mechanically produce:

half of everything.

The monetary remedy should reflect the claimant's proportionate contribution to the accumulation of wealth attributable to the parties' joint efforts.

The court must therefore assess causation and proportionality.

16. Graham Has Serious Quantification Arguments

The property increased greatly in value.

Some of that may have resulted from:

• general Prince Edward County real-estate appreciation;

• land already owned by Graham before cohabitation;

• Graham's winemaking expertise;

• business capital;

• market trends;

• and other factors independent of Odette's contribution.

Likewise, the business already had value when the relationship began.

Odette cannot simply claim half of the entire current $2.4 million enterprise.

The relevant question is what portion of accumulated wealth is fairly attributable to the joint endeavour.

17. Benefits Odette Received During the Relationship Also Matter

The court should consider the economic benefits she received.

They do not necessarily erase the enrichment.

But the value of:

• housing;

• household expenses;

• vehicles;

• and other financial support

may affect the proper amount of any monetary remedy.

Monetary Award or Constructive Trust

18. A Monetary Award Will Often Be the Preferred Remedy

Where unjust enrichment can be adequately remedied in money, a monetary award avoids unnecessarily altering legal title.

If the relationship is properly characterized as a joint family venture, the award may reflect Odette's proportionate contribution to wealth accumulated through that venture rather than a simple hourly wage calculation.

19. A Proprietary Constructive Trust Requires a Stronger Connection to Particular Property

Odette has a particularly strong factual link to the rural property because she:

• contributed $72,000 directly;

• managed improvements;

• and helped create the barn venue that enhanced both property and business value.

That supports an argument for a proprietary remedy.

But constructive trust is not automatic merely because she worked hard.

The court must consider whether:

• her contributions are sufficiently connected to the specific property; and

• a monetary remedy would be inadequate.

20. Odette Has a Strong Unjust-Enrichment Claim but an Uncertain Percentage Claim

The likely result is not:

no property relief because they were unmarried.

Nor is it automatically:

half the business and half the house.

Her contributions are substantial enough to support a serious unjust-enrichment claim.

The difficult work lies in valuing the remedy.

Spousal Support

21. Odette Qualifies as a Spouse for Ontario Support Purposes

The support provisions of the Family Law Act use a broader definition of spouse than the equalization provisions.

Fourteen years of continuous cohabitation easily satisfies the statutory duration requirement.

Odette therefore has standing to seek spousal support despite never having married Graham.

Entitlement

22. Support Entitlement Must Be Established Before Applying the SSAG

The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines do not create entitlement.

The court first examines the statutory support principles and objectives.

Relevant considerations include the economic consequences of the relationship and its breakdown.

23. Odette Has a Strong Compensatory Support Argument

Before reorganizing her life around the vineyard, she earned approximately $82,000.

She then:

• left that employment;

• spent eleven years working in Graham's business without salary;

• and now earns approximately $58,000.

Her present disadvantage is plausibly connected to decisions made during the relationship for the benefit of the shared enterprise.

That is a classic compensatory consideration.

24. She Also Has a Potential Non-Compensatory Claim

There is a substantial post-separation disparity:

• Odette earns about $58,000;

• Graham receives approximately $240,000 annually.

Income disparity alone does not automatically create support.

But in the context of:

• a fourteen-year relationship;

• integrated finances;

• career sacrifice;

• and changed economic circumstances,

need and standard-of-living considerations may reinforce entitlement.

25. Graham's “She Can Work” Argument Goes More to Amount and Duration Than to Eliminating Entitlement

Odette has returned to employment.

That is important.

A support award should recognize appropriate self-sufficiency objectives.

But self-sufficiency is not an absolute requirement to eliminate all economic consequences of a long relationship immediately.

Her current employment does not erase:

• lost career progression;

• reduced earning capacity;

• or her contributions to Graham's wealth.

26. Property and Support Remedies Must Not Be Double Counted

If Odette receives a substantial unjust-enrichment award reflecting her contributions and economic deprivation, that result may be relevant to the parties' post-separation financial positions.

The court should avoid compensating the same economic loss twice.

At the same time, property and support claims protect different interests and one does not automatically eliminate the other.

Overall Advice

27. Odette Does Not Have Statutory Equalization Rights but Has Significant Other Claims

The likely framework is:

• no Part I equalization;

• no automatic matrimonial-home rights;

• a strong unjust-enrichment claim;

• a substantial factual basis for finding a joint family venture;

• likely monetary relief, with a constructive-trust remedy arguable particularly in relation to the rural property;

• no automatic 50% entitlement; and

• a strong basis for spousal-support entitlement under the provincial support regime.

The amount of both equitable property relief and support will require careful assessment of:

• Graham's premarital ownership;

• market appreciation;

• Odette's labour and direct capital contributions;

• benefits she received during cohabitation;

• her career disadvantage;

• and the parties' present means.

Brickam’s Suggested Marking Approach — Question Four

Issue	Marks
Distinguishes unmarried cohabitant property rights from support status under Ontario legislation	3
Unjust enrichment: enrichment, corresponding deprivation and juristic reason	4
Application of Kerr's joint-family-venture factors to mutual effort, integration, intent and career prioritization	4
Quantification: rejects automatic 50% division and addresses premarital wealth, market appreciation and benefits received	3
Monetary award versus constructive trust and connection to specific property	2
Spousal-support status and entitlement, including compensatory and non-compensatory considerations	3
Interaction of property remedy and support / overall conclusion	1
TOTAL	20

Overall Mark Allocation

Question	Marks
Question One — Parenting, Relocation and Family Violence	30
Question Two — Child Support, Shared Parenting and Retroactive Adjustment	25
Question Three — Equalization and the Matrimonial Home	25
Question Four — Unmarried Cohabitants, Unjust Enrichment and Spousal Support	20
TOTAL	100